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Robust versus optimal strategies for two-alternative forced choice tasks

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ABSTRACT

It has been proposed that animals and humans might choose a speed-accuracy tradeoff that maximizes reward rate. For this utility function the simple drift-diffusion model of two-alternative forced-choice tasks predicts a parameter-free optimal performance curve that relates normalized decision times to error rates under varying task conditions. However, behavioral data indicate that only $\approx~30\%$ of subjects achieve optimality, and here we investigate the possibility that, in allowing for uncertainties, subjects might exercise robust strategies instead of optimal ones. We consider two strategies in which robustness is achieved by relinquishing performance: maximin and robust-satisficing. The former supposes maximization of guaranteed performance under a presumed level of uncertainty; the latter assumes that subjects require a critical performance level and maximize the level of uncertainty under which it can be guaranteed. These strategies respectively yield performance curves parameterized by a presumed uncertainty level and required performance. Maximin performance curves for uncertainties in response-to-stimulus interval match data for the lower-scoring 70% of subjects well, and are more likely to explain it than robust-satisficing or alternative optimal performance curves that emphasize accuracy. For uncertainties in signal-to-noise ratio, neither maximin nor robust-satisficing performance curves adequately describe the data. We discuss implications for decisions under uncertainties, and suggest further behavioral assays.

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1. Introduction

There is a substantial literature on random walk and driftdiffusion (DD) processes as models for behavioral measures of reaction time and error rates on two-alternative forced-choice (2AFC) tasks, e.g. Laming (1968), Ratcliff (1978), Ratcliff, Van Zandt, and McKoon (1999), Smith and Ratcliff (2004) and Stone (1960). Additionally, *in vivo* recordings in monkeys trained to respond to motion stimuli show that neural spike rates in certain oculomotor regions evolve like sample paths of a DD process, rising to a threshold prior to response initiation (Gold & Shadlen, 2001; Mazurek, Roitman, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2003; Ratcliff, Cherian, & Segraves, 2003; Ratcliff, Hasegawa, Hasegawa, Smith, & Segraves, 2006; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002; Schall, 2001). Such experiments support a picture in which the state of the DD process, interpreted as a difference between accumulating, noisy evidence streams, is integrated until it reaches a confidence threshold.

The simple DD process with constant signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is a continuum limit of the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT),

* Corresponding author. E-mail address: mermz@tx.technion.ac.il (M. Zacksenhouse). which is optimal for statistically stationary tasks in the sense that, on average, it renders a decision of specified accuracy for the smallest number of observations (Wald, 1947; Wald & Wolfowitz, 1948). It therefore offers a normative theory of decision making against which human and animal behaviors can be assessed (Gold & Shadlen, 2002). Specifically, both speed and accuracy are often at a premium, and a key issue is how these requirements are balanced in a speed-accuracy tradeoff (SAT). Wald and Wolfowitz (1948) used a weighted sum of decision time and error rate as an objective function in their analysis of SPRT, and Edwards (1965) generalized this to model how human subjects choose decision thresholds. This was further extended and tested in Busemeyer and Rapoport (1988) and Rapoport and Burkheimer (1971), and a related theory, involving a competition between reward and accuracy (COBRA), has also been proposed (Bohil & Maddox, 2003; Maddox & Bohil, 1998). A review of these theories appears in Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, and Cohen (2006), which also describes how the DD process with constant SNR emerges from various evidence accumulator models, as parameters approach particular limits.

Gold and Shadlen (2002) then proposed that the DD model be used to derive an explicit SAT that optimizes the reward rate. Bogacz et al. (2006) and Holmes et al. (2005) performed this computation and carried out 2AFC experiments on human subjects to test its predictions. As discussed below, and at greater length





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Table 1 List of abbreviations

Abbreviation	Meaning
2AFC	2 alternative forced choice
COBRA	Competition between reward and accuracy
DD	Drift-diffusion
DT	Decision time
MMPC	Maximin performance curve
OPC	Optimal performance curve
RA	Reward accuracy rate
RR	Reward rate
<i>RR</i> _m	Modified reward rate
RSI	Response-to-stimulus interval
RSPC	Robust-satisficing performance curve
RT	Reaction time
SAT	Speed-accuracy tradeoff
SNR	Signal-to-noise ratio
SPRT	Sequential probability ratio test

in Bogacz, Hu, Cohen, and Holmes (in press), the experiments reveal that, while a significant subset of 80 subjects performed near-optimally, most were substantially sub-optimal, favoring accuracy over speed.

Several explanations have been advanced to account for such behavior. Physiological constraints might prevent neural circuits from integrating evidence in the optimal manner prescribed by the SPRT (cf. Bogacz et al. (2006) and see discussions below). Second, attention may wax and wane, leading to variable SNR (also, experimental protocols often mix stimuli of different discriminability, violating the stationarity assumed in the SPRT and in the blocked experiments of Bogacz et al. (in press)). Third, intentional emphases on accuracy or speed, as in Bohil and Maddox (2003) and Maddox and Bohil (1998), can modulate the SAT at the level of individual subjects. Finally, in addition to assuming statistical stationarity, the SPRT-based optimality theory of Bogacz et al. (2006), Holmes et al. (2005) and Gold and Shadlen (2002) implicitly assumes that key parameters such as experimenter-imposed response-to-stimulus delays and SNR are precisely known to the subject.

In this paper we shall briefly discuss all these factors before focusing on the final one. We suppose that only uncertain estimates are available for key parameters and apply *robust strategies* to predict robust, rather than optimal, SATs. We find that uncertainties in inter-trial delays can account for sub-optimality in the data of Bogacz et al. (in press), while uncertainties in the SNR cannot. Furthermore, we show that a robust strategy, which also involves only one free parameter, provides a better fit than a version of the COBRA theory that includes a weight for accuracy.

The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we review the DD model and derivation of the optimal SAT, describing how it can be expressed as an optimal performance curve (OPC). Robust strategies for 2AFC, which account for parameter uncertainties, are developed in Section 3, and used to derive the robust performance curves. In Section 4 we compare the predictions of the robust approaches with experimental data of Bogacz et al. (2006, in press) and with alternative optimization strategies, and we briefly assess the effects of parameter mis-estimates. Section 5 contains a discussion and proposals for future experiments to further explore our conclusions. Many proofs and other mathematical and statistical details are relegated to Appendices. Common abbreviations used in the paper are summarized in Table 1.

2. A drift-diffusion model and optimal performance curves

The simplest version of a DD process is described by the following stochastic differential equation:

$$dx = A dt + \sigma dW; \quad x(0) = 0, \tag{1}$$

where *A* denotes the drift rate and σ d*W* increments drawn from a Wiener process with standard deviation σ (Gardiner, 1985). Eq. (1) is also known as the Wiener process with drift (Diederich & Busemeyer, 2003). In the 2AFC context, the state variable x(t) represents a running estimate of the logarithmic likelihood ratio (Gold & Shadlen, 2002), the two stimuli produce drift rates $\pm A$ respectively, and on each trial a choice is made when x(t) first crosses either of the predetermined thresholds $\pm x_{th}$. It is implicitly assumed here that stimuli are presented with equal probabilities, that x(0) is initialized midway between the thresholds at the start of each trial as in the optimal SPRT, and that drift, noise level and thresholds remain constant over each block of trials. We shall refer to Eq. (1) as a *pure* DD process, to distinguish it from the *extended* processes described in Section 2.1.

Average performance on a block of trials is characterized by the probability of making an error, p(err), and the *mean decision time*, $\langle DT \rangle$ (the first passage time for (1)), which can be computed explicitly as

$$p(\text{err}) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(2\eta\theta)} \text{ and } \langle DT \rangle = \theta \left[\frac{\exp(2\eta\theta) - 1}{\exp(2\eta\theta) + 1} \right], \quad (2)$$

(Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Gardiner, 1985), cf. (Bogacz et al., 2006, Appendix). Here the parameters $\eta \equiv (A/\sigma)^2$ and $\theta \equiv |x_{th}/A|$ are the SNR (having the units of inverse time), and the threshold-to-drift ratio: i.e., the passage time for the noise-free process x(t) = At. (The present notation differs from Bogacz et al. (2006) to avoid confusion with that used below to describe uncertainty.) In (2) $\langle DT \rangle$ is that part of the *mean reaction time* $\langle RT \rangle$ ascribed to mental processing *per se*, excluding the non-decision latency T_0 required for sensory transduction and motor response, i.e., $\langle DT \rangle = \langle RT \rangle - T_0$.

The formulae of Eq. (2) may be inverted to solve for the DD model parameters, η and θ , in terms of the two performance parameters, p(err) and $\langle DT \rangle$ (cf. Wagenmakers, van der Maas & Grasman, 2007):

$$\theta = \frac{\langle DT \rangle}{1 - 2p(\text{err})} \text{ and } \eta = \frac{1 - 2p(\text{err})}{2\langle DT \rangle} \log\left(\frac{1 - p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})}\right).$$
 (3)

Given a suitable objective function for performance, these explicit formulae allow us to predict a parameter-free optimal performance curve that relates p(err) and $\langle DT \rangle$, as detailed in Section 2.2. However, first we address some shortcomings of the simple DD model of Eq. (1), including neurophysiological factors described next, and behavioral factors addressed in Section 2.1.

As noted in Section 1, the DD model gains support from neurophysiology. A decision model in wide use employs a pair of leaky, mutually-inhibiting accumulators whose states represent the averaged firing rates of populations of neurons preferentially sensitive to different stimuli (Usher & McClelland, 2001). The DD variable x(t) is the difference between these states. However, reduction to a single variable is valid only if leak and inhibition are high, and to a DD process only if they are balanced (Bogacz et al., 2006) and firing rates remain in ranges in which linearization is justified (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990). Recent studies of multi-unit spiking neuron models (Wang, 2002; Wong & Wang, 2006) question these assumptions and suggest that nonlinear models may be necessary (Roxin & Ledberg, 2008). In view of the SPRT results noted above (Wald, 1947; Wald & Wolfowitz, 1948), all such generalizations, and the extended DD models described next, are necessarily non-optimal decision makers.

2.1. Extensions to the DD model

In addition to the neurophysiologically-motivated nonlinear accumulator models mentioned above, extended DD processes have been introduced to better account for human and animal behaviors. In particular, mean reaction times for error and correct trials typically differ, slow errors being frequently observed, whereas the pure DD process (1) predicts identical forms for the probability distributions of DTs for both trial types.

Slow errors can be produced by selecting the drift rate *A* for each trial from a Gaussian distribution, and fast errors result by selecting initial conditions x(0) on each trial from a uniform distribution (Ratcliff et al., 1999). Including a possible overall bias, so that $\langle x(0) \rangle \neq 0$, these increase the number of DD parameters from two to five. To further allow for variability, the nondecision time T_0 can also be taken from a distribution (Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002). Alternatively, time-dependent drift rates A(t), which can represent varying attention, can produce slow or fast errors (Ditterich, 2006a,b; Eckhoff, Holmes, Law, Connolly, & Gold, 2008; Liu, Holmes, & Cohen, 2008), in principle expanding the model to an infinite-dimensional parameter space.

Variable drift rates (either within or between trials) seem most relevant to account for differences in the reaction time distributions of error and correct decisions. However, as noted at the end of Section 2.2, the resulting optimal performance curves fail to match the observed preference for accuracy over speed in the present data (Bogacz et al., 2006). Here we develop a normative theory of robust decision making, based on the pure DD model, which accounts well for this observed preference. We introduce a new factor: the degree of uncertainty in estimating specific model parameters. Comparing the effects on different parameters, we are able to assess which source of uncertainty may best explain the observed behavior, and to contrast it with the emphasis placed on accuracy in theories such as COBRA (Bohil & Maddox, 2003; Maddox & Bohil, 1998). Furthermore, we show that uncertainties in SNR also allow variable drift rates, and thus can account for differences in DT distributions for error and correct decisions.

2.2. Optimal performance curves

To determine optimal strategies for a given experimental paradigm, we must specify an objective or utility function. Here we consider the paradigm of Gold and Shadlen (2002), in which a subject is presented with a stimulus and is free to indicate a choice (by motor or oculomotor response) at any time. Correct responses are rewarded and after each response there is a fixed delay or response-to-stimulus interval (RSI), denoted D_{RSI} , before the next trial begins. This may be increased by a penalty delay $D_{pen} \ge 0$ in the event of an error. Trials are run sequentially in blocks in which delays and stimulus discriminabilities are constant. The duration of each block, rather than the number of trials within it, is fixed, thereby presenting subjects with a clear challenge of balancing accuracy with speed (the number of trials completed in the block).

Gold and Shadlen (2002) propose that subjects seek to maximize their *average reward rates* (*RR*), defined as the fraction of correct responses divided by the average time between responses:

$$RR(p(err), \langle DT \rangle : D_{RSI}, T_0, D_{pen})$$

$$=\frac{1-p(\text{err})}{\langle DT\rangle + T_0 + D_{\text{RSI}} + p(\text{err})D_{\text{pen}}}.$$
(4)

Appendix A.1 shows that the mean number of correct decisions per unit time is given asymptotically by Eq. (4). For simplicity we have assumed that the non-decision time T_0 and the response-to-stimulus interval D_{RSI} remain fixed during each block of trials over which the reward rate is to be maximized, but if these are variable one would simply replace them with their means $\langle T_0 \rangle$ and $\langle D_{RSI} \rangle$. Since only the combination $T_0 + D_{RSI}$ appears in (4), we define the non-decision delay $D = T_0 + D_{RSI}$, and for future use, the total delay $D_{tot} = D + D_{pen}$.

Substituting Eqs. (2) into Eq. (4) yields the reward rate that can be achieved as a function of the decision parameter θ and the task parameters η , D and D_{tot} :

$$RR(\theta:\eta, D, D_{\text{tot}}) = [\theta + D + (D_{\text{tot}} - \theta) \exp(-2\eta\theta)]^{-1}.$$
 (5)

The response-to-stimulus interval, $D_{\rm RSI}$, penalty delay, $D_{\rm pen}$, and stimulus discriminability are under the experimenter's control and remain fixed throughout each block of trials. Stimulus discriminability determines the SNR, η , at least partially. To the extent that subjects can manipulate η , e.g., by increasing attention and thus decreasing the noise-variance σ^2 , Eq. (5) implies that it should be maximized to achieve optimal *RR*. We therefore assume that η is fixed in each block (this will be relaxed when addressing uncertainties in Section 3). Under these conditions, the thresholdto-drift ratio, θ , is the only adjustable parameter, so local maxima of *RR* occur at zeros of $\partial RR/\partial \theta$, and the optimal threshold $\theta_{\rm op}$ satisfies:

$$\exp(2\eta\theta) - 1 = 2\eta(D_{\text{tot}} - \theta).$$
(6)

The left hand side of (6) is monotonically increasing with θ and its right hand side is monotonically decreasing, so it has a unique solution θ_{op} that depends only upon η and D_{tot} . This unique solution determines the globally optimal normalized threshold, leaving the optimal decision maker with no free decision parameter. The corresponding optimal reward rate is given by $RR_{op} = RR(\theta_{op} : \eta, D, D_{tot})$, and depends also on *D*.

Eq. (6) establishes a relationship among θ , η and D_{tot} that must hold if *RR* is maximized. Substituting Eqs. (3), the DD model parameters θ and η can be replaced by the performance parameters $\langle DT \rangle$ and p(err) to obtain:

$$\frac{\langle DT \rangle}{D_{\text{tot}}} = \left[\frac{1}{p(\text{err})\log\left(\frac{1-p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})}\right)} + \frac{1}{1-2p(\text{err})}\right]^{-1}.$$
 (7)

This optimal performance curve (OPC), pictured in Fig. 1 and first derived in Bogacz et al. (2006) and Holmes et al. (2005), is a unique, parameter-free relationship that describes the SAT: the tradeoff between speed $(\langle DT \rangle / D_{tot})$ and accuracy (1 - p(err))that must hold in order to maximize RR for the given task conditions. Each condition, specified by SNR η and total delay D_{tot} , determines a unique optimal threshold-to-drift ratio θ_{op} , given by Eq. (6), and hence a SAT that maximizes the RR for that condition. As task conditions vary – by manipulating η via stimulus discriminability, or D_{tot} via the RSI – θ_{op} changes, and with it, the SAT that maximizes RR. To illustrate this, in Fig. 1(a) we mark eight points, corresponding to different SNR and D_{tot} values, on the OPC. Each of these conditions yields a different RR, as enumerated in the figure caption, but each RR is optimal for that condition; indeed, all (p(err), $\langle DT \rangle / D_{tot})$ pairs on the OPC correspond to optimal performances.

The form of the OPC may be intuitively understood by observing that very noisy stimuli ($\eta \approx 0$) contain little information, so that given a priori knowledge that they are equally likely, it is optimal to choose at random without examining them, giving p(err) = 0.5 and $\langle DT \rangle = 0$ (note the points for $\eta = 0.1$ in Fig. 1(a)). At the opposite limit $\eta \rightarrow \infty$, noise-free stimuli are so easy to discriminate that both $\langle DT \rangle$ and p(err) approach zero (note the points for $\eta = 100$ in Fig. 1(a)). This limit yields the highest RRs, but when SNR is finite, due to poor stimulus discriminability or a subject's inability to clearly detect a signal, making immediate decisions is not optimal. Instead, it is advantageous to accumulate the noisy evidence for just long enough to make the best possible choice (see the points for $\eta = 1$ and $\eta = 10$ in Fig. 1(a)).

Thresholds that differ from the optimal threshold cause suboptimal performance, as illustrated by the diamonds in Fig. 1(a),



Fig. 1. (a) Optimal performance curve of Eq. (7) relating mean normalized decision time to error-rate under varying task conditions. Triangles and circles mark the performance under the specified task conditions. Moving leftwards, the resulting RRs increase with SNR from 0.51 to 0.60, 0.84 and 0.97 for $D_{tot} = 1$, and from 0.26 to 0.33, 0.45 and 0.49 for $D_{tot} = 2$. Diamonds mark suboptimal performance points resulting from thresholds 25% above and below the optimal threshold for SNR=1 and $D_{tot} = 2$; both yield $\approx 1.3\%$ degradation in the RR. (b) Thick curve shows the optimal performance curve of Eq. (7), and histograms show data collected from 80 human subjects, sorted according to total scores. Refer to the text for experimental conditions. White bars: all subjects; lightest bars: lowest 10% excluded; medium bars: lowest 50% excluded; darkest bars: lowest 70% excluded. Vertical line segments indicate standard errors. From Holmes et al. (2005, Fig. 1).

which result from setting θ 25% above or below θ_{op} for $\eta = 1$ and $D_{tot} = 2$. In both cases the *RR* degrades by $\approx 1.3\%$.

To test whether humans can optimize their performance, two experiments were carried out using different 2AFC tasks, as detailed in Bogacz et al. (2006, in press). In the first, 20 subjects viewed motion stimuli (Britten, Shadlen, Newsome, & Movshon, 1993) and received 1 cent for each correct discrimination. The experiment was divided into 7 min blocks with different penalty delays and response-to-stimulus intervals: three with $D_{pen} = 0$ and $D_{RSI} = 0.5$ s, 1.0 s, and 2.0 s, respectively, and one with $D_{\text{pen}} = 1.5 \text{ s and } D_{\text{RSI}} = 0.5 \text{ s}$. One block of trials was run for each condition except for $D_{\text{pen}} = 0$, $D_{\text{RSI}} = 2.0 \text{ s}$, for which two blocks were required to gather sufficient data. In the second experiment, 60 subjects discriminated if the majority of 100 locations on a visual display were filled with stars or empty (Ratcliff et al., 1999). The design was the same as that of the first experiment except that blocks lasted for 4 min, and the set of 5 blocks was repeated under two difficulty conditions. In both cases subjects were instructed to maximize their total earnings, and unrewarded practice blocks were administered before the tests began.

Since the OPC is independent of the parameters defining the DD process, and D_{tot} enters only as the denominator of the normalized

decision time, data from different subjects and blocks of trials, with various SNRs and delays, can be combined in a single histogram for comparison with the OPC. For each subject and condition p(err)swere computed and mean decision times $\langle DT \rangle$ estimated by fitting the DD model to reaction time distributions, as described in Bogacz et al. (2006). The range of error rates from 0%-50% was then divided into 10 bins and a mean normalized decision time $\langle \langle DT \rangle / D_{tot} \rangle$ computed for each bin by averaging over all subjects and task conditions with error rates in that bin, yielding the white bars in Fig. 1 (Bogacz et al., in press; Holmes et al., 2005). The shaded bars show results of the same analysis restricted to subgroups of subjects ranked according to their total rewards accrued over all blocks of trials and conditions. This reveals that the top 30% of subjects perform near the optimal SAT (the darkest bars lie close to the OPC), but that those with lower total scores exhibit significantly longer mean normalized decision times.

As noted in Section 1, this suboptimal behavior may reflect the valuation of accuracy over speed, but it may also happen that subjects try to optimize their performances and fail to do so due to erroneous estimates of delays or SNR. (Since optimal thresholds depend on D_{tot} and η (Eq. (6)), errors in estimating them would lead to sub-optimality.) In this case, however, both under- and over-estimation would be expected to occur, yielding individual performances both below and above the OPC (see diamonds on Fig. 1(a)), in contrast with the averaged performance above the OPC in Fig. 1(b). We shall revisit this point at the end of Section 4, after showing in Section 3 that the data is captured well by assuming that subjects apply robust rather than optimal strategies and explicitly account for uncertainties in delays.

We believe that the conditions under which this data was collected, with stimulus discriminability and RSIs fixed during each block of trials, along with training sessions and emphasis on maximizing rewards, strongly encouraged subjects to improve their ability to extract signal from noise, thereby driving their decision mechanisms closer to that described by the optimal DD process. Indeed, while fits to an extended DD process with variability in A and x(0) improved on pure DD fits, a detailed comparison, summarized in Appendix D, reveals that both models capture a similar proportion of the variance in subjects' thresholds. Furthermore, allowing variability in A and x(0) results in OPCs that differ qualitatively from the experimental data (Bogacz et al., 2006, Fig. 14). Specifically, trial-to-trial variability in A decreases the mean normalized decision time for a given error rate, favoring speed over accuracy, and variability in x(0) results in mean normalized decision times higher than those observed at low error rates. We therefore believe that it is reasonable to use pure DD fits in comparing the data from all 80 subjects with the OPC, and with the alternative performance curves described below.

2.3. Performance curves weighted for accuracy

The tendency to value accuracy over speed has been noted earlier (Bohil & Maddox, 2003; Maddox & Bohil, 1998; Myung & Busemeyer, 1989). This motivates the investigation of alternative objective functions (Bogacz et al., 2006; Holmes et al., 2005). We give two examples.

The first is a modified *reward-accuracy rate* that additionally penalizes errors, as suggested by the COBRA theory (Bohil & Maddox, 2003; Maddox & Bohil, 1998):

$$RA = RR - \frac{qp(err)}{D_{tot}}.$$
(8)

Here *q* specifies the relative weight placed on accuracy, and the characteristic time D_{tot} is included so that the units of both terms are (time)⁻¹. Secondly, for monetary rewards one can suppose

that errors are penalized by subtraction from previous winnings, leading to the modified reward rate:

$$RR_m = \frac{(1 - p(\text{err})) - qp(\text{err})}{\langle DT \rangle + D_{\text{tot}}}.$$
(9)

(Here we require q < 1, so that rewards are positive.) The functions defining *RA* and *RR_m* each involve a single parameter q, and reduce to *RR* for q = 0. Since errors are explicitly penalized in the expressions (8) and (9), no additional delay D_{pen} is included in D_{tot} here.

In Appendix A.2 we derive one-parameter families of OPCs for these objective functions and briefly characterize them (Eqs. (A.3)–(A.4) and (A.6)). We show that mean normalized decision times are well-defined for *RA* provided that $q \leq 1.096$. Furthermore, the resulting OPCs for *RA* are scaled versions of the OPC for RR while the OPCs for *RR_m* are not. These modified OPCs will be assessed against the data in Section 4, along with predictions from robust decision making (see Fig. 6).

In the next section we develop decision strategies for the 2AFC task that are robust against uncertainties in either delays (Section 3.1) or SNR (Section 3.2). We show that they differ from the optimal strategies described above, and in Section 4 we argue that the data is more consistent with the use of robust decision strategies against uncertainties in delays than for any of the optimal procedures, especially for 70% of the subjects with lower total scores. In common with optimal ones, robust strategies require threshold setting, or, equivalently, the formulation of a stopping criterion for the decision procedure. We do not consider these issues here, but see Busemeyer and Myung (1992) and Myung and Busemeyer (1989) for models of criterion learning, and see Simen, Cohen, and Holmes (2006) for a neural network implementation of threshold setting in the DD model context.

3. Robust decisions under uncertainties

Optimal decision theory presumes that subjects maximize a relevant utility function, given the actual task parameters. However, these parameters are rarely known with accuracy and decisions must be made under uncertainties. In 2AFC tasks, as shown in Section 2.2, the *RR* depends on inter-trial delays and the SNR: quantities that may be difficult to estimate.

There are two major methodologies for handling parameter uncertainty, based on whether parameters are assumed to be stochastic or not (Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 2008. The stochastic approach presumes that the uncertain parameters are characterized by a joint probability distribution. Given the distribution, the optimal strategy may be applied to select the decision that maximizes the expected utility. More generally, when only the class of possible distributions – but not the exact distribution – is known, the maximin strategy may be applied to select the decision that maximizes the minimum expected utility across all possible distributions (Wald, 1950). In either case, the stochastic approach requires additional information about the distribution function or the class of possible distributions.

Here we pursue a non-stochastic approach, which presumes that the parameters are deterministic but unknown (Ben-Haim, 2006; Ben-Tal & Nemirovski, 2008). First, we consider the case of bounded uncertainty, in which parameters are assumed to be bounded within a specific uncertainty set, and apply the maximin strategy to select the decision that maximizes the minimum utility (Section 3.1). We consider both uncertainties in delays (Section 3.1.1) and in SNR (Section 3.1.2) and show that the basic pattern of maximin performance curves for the former agrees well with the experimental data, while that for uncertainties in SNR does not. We then consider the case in which only the family of uncertainty sets, rather than a specific one, is known. In this case, robust decisions are based on the notion of satisficing, i.e., satisfying an aspiration level of performance that is deemed sufficient. Simon (1956, 1982), who coined this term, suggested that the tendency to satisfice appears in many cognitive tasks including game playing, problem solving, and financial decisions, in which people typically do not or cannot seek an optimal solution (Reber, 1995). Given an aspiration level of performance, the robust-satisficing strategy (Ben-Haim, 2006) selects the decision that achieves that performance under the largest uncertainty set as detailed in Section 3.2. The resulting performance curves are slightly inferior to the maximin performance curves in fitting the experimental data. We therefore outline this strategy only briefly, and discuss its potential relevance for other 2AFC experimental paradigms.

Robust decisions under parameter uncertainties can also account for trial-to-trial variations in the parameter. Trial-totrial variations in drift rate are of special interest, given their role in explaining differences between correct and error response times (Section 2.2). Bounded trial-to-trial variations in drift rate are considered in Section 3.1.2, where, in terms of the maximin strategy, they are shown to be a special case of uncertainties in the SNR. As mentioned above, robust decisions under uncertainties in the SNR do not explain the experimental data well, so while trialto-trial variations in drift rate may occur, they cannot alone explain the observed sub-optimal performance.

3.1. Maximin performance curves

3.1.1. Uncertainties in delays

Uncertainty set: Uncertainties in delays may arise from poor estimation. Extensive investigations of interval timing, reviewed in Buhusi and Meck (2005), indicate that estimated intervals are normally distributed around the true duration with a standard deviation proportional to it. This is known as the scalar property of interval timing (Gibbon, 1977); it suggests that the size of the uncertainty set for the true interval increases with its duration.

According to Eq. (5), the *RR* is affected by both the non-decision delay $D = D_{RSI} + T_0$ (which combines the response-to-stimulus interval and the non-decision latency) and the total delay $D_{tot} = D + D_{pen}$ (which also includes the penalty delay), so we consider uncertainties in both of these delays. Their estimated values are referred to as the *nominal delays*, and denoted by \tilde{D} and \tilde{D}_{tot} . Accounting for the scalar property of interval timing, subjects are assumed to base their decisions on the assumption that the actual values are within the *presumed uncertainty set* given by:

$$U_{p}(\alpha_{p}:\tilde{D},\tilde{D}_{tot}) = \left\{ D, D_{tot} > 0: \left| D - \tilde{D} \right| \le \alpha_{p}\tilde{D}, \left| D_{tot} - \tilde{D}_{tot} \right| \le \alpha_{p}\tilde{D}_{tot} \right\}, (10)$$

where the size of the uncertainty set is proportional to the nominal delay with a proportionality constant α_p . We refer to α_p as the *presumed level of uncertainty*, and note that it reflects the subject's assessment of how well he or she may estimate the interval's duration. In this section we assume that α_p is known to the subject based on past experience with interval timing.

Maximin decision strategy: The optimal strategy of Section 2.2 maximizes the *RR* that can be achieved with the nominal delays, but ignores potential degradation in performance due to unfavorable delays. Instead, the maximin strategy focuses on the worst *RR* that could be obtained given the presumed level of uncertainty α_p , and selects the maximin threshold θ_{MM} that maximizes this minimum, as defined next.

Definition 3.1. The maximin threshold θ_{MM} under uncertainties in the delays is the threshold that maximizes the worst *RR* under the presumed uncertainty set $U_p(\alpha_p : \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ for the delays, given the presumed level of uncertainty, α_p , the nominal delays, \tilde{D} and \tilde{D}_{tot} , and the SNR, η :

$$\theta_{MM}(\alpha_p : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) = \arg \max_{\theta} \left(\min_{D, D_{tot} \in U_p(\alpha_p; \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})} RR(\theta : \eta, D, D_{tot}) \right).$$
(11)

Maximin performance curves: The inner minimization in Eq. (11) specifies the lowest *RR* possible using the threshold θ , given that delays lie within the presumed uncertainty set. This occurs when delays are longest, as detailed in Appendix B.1. Viewed as a function of threshold θ , the worst *RR* has a single maximum, which specifies the unique maximin threshold θ_{MM} , as described in Appendix B.2. The resulting condition, Eq. (B.3), dictates a unique SAT that must hold to maximize the worst *RR*, as stated in the next theorem.

Theorem 3.1. Maximin performance curve under uncertainties in the delays: Maximizing the worst RR under the presumed uncertainty set given by Eq. (10), imposes the following tradeoff between the speed $(\langle DT \rangle / \tilde{D}_{tot})$ and accuracy (1 - p(err)):

$$\langle DT \rangle$$

$$D_{tot}$$

$$= \gamma (1 + \alpha_p) \left[\frac{1}{p(\text{err}) \log \left(\frac{1 - p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})} \right)} + \frac{1}{1 - 2p(\text{err})} \right]^{-1}, \quad (12)$$

where $\gamma \equiv \frac{\tilde{D}_{tot}}{D_{tot}}$ is the ratio between the nominal and actual delays. This tradeoff is referred to as the maximin performance curve (MMPC).

Proof. See Appendix B.2. □

The MMPCs specified by Eq. (12) are simply scaled copies of the OPC given by Eq. (7), which is the special case of a MMPC with $\alpha_p = 0$ and $\gamma = 1$. Thus, the MMPCs define a one-parameter family of performance curves parameterized by the scaling factor $\gamma(1+\alpha_p)$, as depicted in Fig. 2. When the nominal delay is exact, i.e., $D_{\text{tot}} = \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}$ and hence $\gamma = 1$, the resulting MMPCs are referred to as the nominal MMPCs (Fig. 2, dashed curves). When the nominal delay differs from the actual value, the nominal MMPCs are further scaled by the corresponding ratio γ . Assuming that the actual delay is within the presumed uncertainty set, this ratio is bounded by $(1 + \alpha_p)^{-1} \leq \gamma \leq (1 - \alpha_p)^{-1}$. Thus, performance may range within a performance band bounded above by the extreme MMPC given by Eq. (12) with $\gamma = (1 - \alpha_p)^{-1}$ (Fig. 2, dash-dotted curves) and below by the OPC obtained for $\gamma = (1 + \alpha_p)^{-1}$ (Fig. 2, solid curve).

Since the MMPCs are scaled copies of the OPC, they all peak at the same error rate (\approx 17.41%, see Appendix A.2). The MMPCs and performance bands capture the qualitative form of the experimental data fairly well, especially for error rates in the range 15%–35%, in which the mean normalized decision times peak and are widely spread. Quantitative comparisons are given in Section 4.

3.1.2. Uncertainties in signal-to-noise ratios

Apart from delays, performance is also affected by the drift rate *A* and noise variance σ^2 that characterize the DD process. Uncertainty in these parameters gives rise to uncertainties in the SNR $\eta = A^2/\sigma^2$. Here we develop 2AFC strategies that are



Fig. 2. Maximin performance curves (MMPCs) and performance bands for two presumed levels of uncertainty $\alpha_p = 0.2$, 0.4 in delays. Nominal MMPCs for $D_{\text{tot}} = \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}$ (dashed), and extreme MMPCs for $D_{\text{tot}} = \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}(1 - \alpha_p)$ (dash-dotted) and for $D_{\text{tot}} = \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}(1 + \alpha_p)$ (solid) are shown; the latter coincide with the OPC for all α_p (cf. Eq. (12) with $\gamma = (1 + \alpha_p)^{-1}$ and Eq. (7)). Performance bands consistent with the presumed level of uncertainty are bounded by the extreme MMPC and the OPC.

robust against uncertainties in the SNR, but show that the resulting maximin performance curves do not match the experimental data as well as MMPCs under uncertainties in delays.

The analysis is also extended to allow for trial-to-trial variations in the SNR. In particular, we focus on variations in the SNR that arise from trial-to-trial variations in drift rate, since these have been important in explaining differences between correct and error reaction times. Here, however, the drift rate in each trial is assumed to be bounded within a presumed uncertainty set, instead of drawn from a Gaussian distribution (Ratcliff et al., 1999). We show that such trial-to-trial variations do not affect the performance curves, and thus cannot contribute to explaining the observed sub-optimal performance.

Uncertainty set for fixed SNR: First we consider the case in which the SNR is fixed but unknown. The estimated SNR is referred to as the nominal SNR, denoted by $\tilde{\eta}$. Given $\tilde{\eta}$, subjects are presumed to base decisions on the assumption that the actual SNR is a fixed value within the presumed uncertainty set specified by:

$$U_p(\alpha_p, \tilde{\eta}) = \left\{ \eta > 0 : |\eta - \tilde{\eta}| \le \alpha_p \tilde{\eta} \right\}.$$
(13)

The case in which the actual SNR may vary from trial-to-trial is considered at the end of this section.

Sources of uncertainty in SNR: A given level of uncertainty in the SNR may reflect different combinations of uncertainties in drift rate *and* noise variance. While neither of these factors appears explicitly in the expression (5) for the reward rate, the drift rate appears implicitly in defining the threshold-to-drift ratio $\theta = |x_{th}/A|$. Thus, specifying θ defines the size of the actual threshold x_{th} unambiguously only if uncertainties arise solely from uncertainties in the noise variance.

Alternatively, when uncertainties in the SNR are due to drift rate alone, analysis is facilitated by normalizing the threshold by noise variance and defining the threshold-to-noise ratio $\vartheta = |x_{th}/\sigma|$, which specifies the size of x_{th} unambiguously in this case. For simplicity we consider only these two ideal cases: uncertainties in the SNR arising from noise variance with known drift rate, and uncertainties in the SNR arising from the drift rate, with known noise variance.

Uncertainties in noise variance: The maximin threshold and resulting MMPCs are developed in Appendix B.3, and depicted in



Fig. 3. MMPCs for two presumed levels $\alpha_p = 0.3$, 0.6 of uncertainties in the SNR arising from uncertain noise variance. Nominal MMPC for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}$ (dashed), and extreme MMPC for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}(1 + \alpha_p)$ (dash-dotted) and for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}(1 - \alpha_p)$ (solid); the latter coincide with the OPC for all α_p . Performance bands for the SNR within the range consistent with the presumed uncertainty are bounded by the extreme MMPC and the OPC.



Fig. 4. MMPCs for two presumed levels $\alpha_p = 0.45$, 0.9 of uncertainty in SNR arising from uncertain drift rate. Nominal MMPC for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}$ (dashed), and extreme MMPCs for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}(1 + \alpha_p)$ (dash-dotted) and for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}(1 - \alpha_p)$ (solid); the latter coincides with the OPC for all α_p . Performance bands for SNR within the range consistent with the presumed uncertainty are bounded by the extreme MMPC and the OPC.

Fig. 3 for two levels of presumed uncertainty. The curves exhibit a leftward shift in the peak location that is not characteristic of the experimental data, and stands in contrast with the MMPCs for uncertainties in delays (see Fig. 2). We shall nonetheless revisit these MMPCs in the detailed comparison presented in Section 4, in order to quantitatively assess the relative likelihood of uncertainties in delays versus uncertainties in the SNR (due to noise variance) in accounting for the experimental results.

Uncertainties in drift rate: The maximin threshold and resulting MMPCs are developed in Appendix B.4, and depicted in Fig. 4 for two levels of presumed uncertainty. They also exhibit leftward shifts in peak values and moreover lie below the OPC for most error rates. Since these MMPCs deviate even further from the data than those of Fig. 3, they are excluded from the comparisons of Section 4. They are nonetheless important in evaluating the maximin strategy under trial-to-trial variations in the drift rate, as described next.

Trial-to-trial variations in drift rate: Trial-to-trial variations in drift rate have been invoked to explain the differences between the

correct and error reaction times (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff et al., 1999; Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). Here we extend our robust analysis to account for such variations and assess their effect on the performance curves. Instead of drawing drift rates from a Gaussian distribution, we assume that they belong to an infinite sequence of unknown but bounded values. Following the discussion above, variations in drift rate are formulated as trial-to-trial variations in the SNR with fixed and known noise variance. The presumed uncertainty set for an infinite sequence of SNRs is

$$U_{p,\text{seq}}(\alpha_p,\tilde{\eta}) = \left\{ \{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty} : \eta_i > 0, \, |\eta_i - \tilde{\eta}| \le \alpha_p \tilde{\eta} \right\},\tag{14}$$

where η_i denotes the SNR on the *i*th trial.

With known noise variance, the threshold-to-noise ratio ϑ determines the actual threshold unambiguously. For a fixed threshold-to-noise ratio, the worst case scenario that guides the maximin strategy is independent of whether the SNR is fixed or allowed to vary from trial to trial. Hence, for the same presumed level of uncertainty α_p , the worst case performance is the same, as stated in the next theorem:

Theorem 3.2. Worst performance with a variable SNR: Consider a 2AFC task with fixed threshold-to-noise ratio ϑ . The worst performance that can occur with any sequence of bounded SNRs consistent with the presumed uncertainty set of Eq. (14) coincides with the worst performance that can occur with a fixed SNR consistent with the presumed uncertainty set of Eq. (13) at the same presumed level of uncertainty α_p .

Proof. See Appendix B.5.

Theorem 3.2 implies that the performance curves for the variable SNR case considered above are the same as those for the fixed SNR case depicted in Fig. 4. Since these MMPCs do not match the experimental data well, robust strategies for uncertainties in drift rate cannot account for the observed SATs, even when they include bounded trial-to-trial variations.

3.2. Robust-satisficing performance curves

Robust-satisficing decision strategy: The maximin strategy presumes that the level of uncertainty is known. Furthermore, it appeals to worst case performance, which may be very unlikely, and it yields prudent and pessimistic decisions. Robust-satisficing instead focuses on meeting a sufficient or required level of performance despite the uncertainties (Ben-Haim, 2006). It has been applied successfully to explain a range of decision making, including foraging behavior, where a critical level of food intake is required for survival (Carmel & Ben-Haim, 2005), and equity premium, in which a critical level of return is required (Ben-Haim, 2006).

As shown in this section, applying the robust-satisficing strategy to 2AFC tasks results in performance curves that differ from those associated with the maximin strategy. Under uncertainties in delays, these robust-satisficing performance curves (RSPCs) are marginally inferior to the MMPCs in describing the experimental data, while performance curves for uncertainties in SNR deviate substantially from it. Thus, we focus on robust-satisficing against uncertainties in delays. While the MMPCs match the data better, we argue in the discussion that this may depend on the reward policy and that robust-satisficing may be relevant for explaining decision making in other 2AFC tasks. The presentation is brief, with details deferred to Appendices.

Info-gap model: When the level of uncertainty is unknown, only a family of uncertainty sets, rather than a unique set, can be specified. Motivated by the scalar property of interval timing, the presumed uncertainty set of Eq. (10) is extended to define an



Fig. 5. Robust satisficing performance curves (RSPCs, dashed) for uncertainties in delays given three normalized required performance levels $q = (R_r^{-1} - D)/D_{tot}$. Here the nominal delay ratio $\tilde{D}/\tilde{D}_{tot} = 1$ is assumed, corresponding to the case of zero penalty delay. The OPC (solid) bounds the RSPCs below, but extensions of RSPCs under the OPC are also relevant (cf. dash-dotted line for q = 0.5) and see Appendix B.7).

unbounded, nested family of uncertainty intervals parameterized by the level of uncertainty α :

$$U(\alpha : D, D_{\text{tot}}) = \left\{ D, D_{\text{tot}} > 0 : \left| D - \tilde{D} \right| \le \alpha \tilde{D}, \quad \left| D_{\text{tot}} - \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}} \right| \le \alpha \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}} \right\}, \\ \forall \alpha \ge 0.$$
(15)

Such a structure is known as an information-gap (*info-gap*) model of uncertainty (Ben-Haim, 2006). Unboundedness implies that the lengths of the intervals increase without bound as the uncertainty level increases. Nesting implies that the intervals associated with larger uncertainty levels include those associated with smaller levels.

Robustness and robust-satisficing threshold: Consider a fixed threshold θ , which achieves the nominal reward rate $RR(\theta : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ of Eq. (5), under the nominal delays \tilde{D} and \tilde{D}_{tot} . As the level of uncertainty increases, adverse delays may be encountered and the reward rate may deteriorate. Robustness assesses how far the level of uncertainty may increase without jeopardizing the required *RR*. Noting that a better than nominal *RR* cannot be guaranteed even without uncertainty, the robustness for such a requirement is defined to be zero. Otherwise, the robustness is the largest level of uncertainty under which the required *RR* can be guaranteed. For a fixed threshold, robustness is a non-increasing function of *RR*: *RR* = 0 (if such would ever satisfy anyone!) may be achieved with infinite robustness, while better than nominal *RR* have zero robustness. See Appendix B.6 for rigorous definitions and derivations.

Given a sub-optimal required reward rate R_r , the robustsatisficing strategy selects the threshold that provides the largest robustness. The resulting RSPCs are derived in Appendix B.7 (see Eq. (B.27)). Representative RSPCs are depicted in Fig. 5 (dashed lines) for zero penalty delay $D_{\text{pen}} = 0$ (i.e., $D = D_{\text{tot}}$), and three different levels of normalized required performance $q \equiv (R_r^{-1} - D)/D_{\text{tot}}$. All the RSPCs peak at $p(\text{err}) \approx 13.52\%$: to the left of the OPCs and MMPCs that peak at $p(\text{err}) \approx 17.41\%$. Since the RSPCs are evaluated for $D_{\text{pen}} = 0$, they must be evaluated against experiments without penalty delays. This is done in Section 4, where it is shown that the leftward shift slightly degrades the data fit (see Fig. 6 and Table 4).

The robust satisficing strategy is relevant only when the required reward rate is sub-optimal, i.e., $R_r < RR_{op}(\eta : \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$.

Table 2

Numbers of experimental conditions falling into each error rate bin for the three panels of Fig. 6.

Error rate range (%)	Тор 30%	Middle 60%	Bottom 10%
0–5	37	82	9
5–10	17	32	7
10–15	12	12	3
15–20	12	23	6
20–25	19	35	2
25-30	15	39	5
30–35	7	13	4
35-40	1	6	2
40-45	1	5	2
45-50	4	3	2

In Appendix B.7 it is shown that this constrains the RSPCs to lie above the OPC. Since the experimental data also primarily lies above the OPC, this is the main region of interest. Nevertheless, as noted in Appendix B.7, the extension of RSPCs below the OPC is also meaningful and the complete RSPCs are used for the analysis of Section 4.

3.3. Summary of robust strategies

We have presented two robust strategies, maximin and robustsatisficing, and derived the associated performance curves under different sources of uncertainty. Performance curves strongly depend on the source of uncertainty and appear to qualitatively match the data of Fig. 1 best for uncertainties in delays, with MMPCs seeming marginally superior to RSPCs (Figs. 2 and 5). Uncertainties in SNR do not appear as relevant to the present data, particularly when they arise from uncertainties in drift rate (Fig. 4) rather than noise variance (Fig. 3).

4. Comparisons with experimental data

In this section we assess quantitative fits of robust performance curves to the behavioral data. Following the qualitative analyses of Section 3 (summarized in Section 3.3) we focus on the three best candidates: MMPCs and RSPCs for uncertainties in delays, and MMPCs for uncertainties in noise variance. For comparison, we also assess the OPCs for the alternative objective functions introduced in Section 2.3: the modified reward-accuracy rate RA and modified reward-rate RR_m .

Experimental data: We limit our comparison to data from blocks with no penalty delays $D_{pen} = 0$ (i.e., $D_{tot} = D$), because OPCs for RR_m and RA are only defined for $D_{pen} = 0$, and RSPCs for uncertainty in delays involve the ratio D/D_{tot} , which differs between blocks with $D_{pen} = 0$ and $D_{pen} > 0$.

As noted in Section 2, the SAT differs among subjects with different total scores, and hence performance curves must be compared with data from different groups of subjects separately. In particular, some subjects with the lowest scores had decision times an order of magnitude higher than others (see the bottom panel of Fig. 6), and we therefore analyze the lowest 10% of subjects separately. We then split the remaining 90% into 3 equal groups, but upon finding no significant difference between the mean normalized decision times of the 30%-60% and 60%-90% groups (paired *t*-test across 10 ranges of error rates: p > 0.35), we henceforth pooled the data from these two groups. Normalized decision times for the resulting middle 60% and for the top 30% groups are shown in the upper panels of Fig. 6. The number of experimental conditions falling into each bin (i.e. the number of data points averaged to obtain each mean decision time) is given in Table 2.

Fitting method: Except for the parameter-free OPC for *RR*, each performance curve includes one free parameter, denoted by *q* or



Fig. 6. Comparisons of performance curves with mean normalized decision times from experimental blocks with $D_{pen} = 0$ for three groups of subjects sorted by total rewards acquired. Error bars show the standard error of mean normalized decision times. Note the difference in scale of the vertical axes in upper and lower panels. Here and throughout this section, maximin_{SNR} refers to the MMPC due to uncertainty in noise variance, maximin_D and robust_D refer to MMPC and RSPC, respectively, due to uncertain delays.

 α . We estimated these parameters via the maximum likelihood method, using the standard assumption that normalized decision times are normally distributed around the performance curve being fitted, with variance estimated from the data. As noted in Section 2.3, the OPC for *RA* is not defined for weight parameters q > 1.096 (cf. inequality (A.5) of Appendix A.2) and the OPC for *RR_m* is not defined for p(err) s close to 0.5 if q > 1, so in fitting these functions we restricted to $q \leq 1.096$ and $q \leq 1$ respectively. Further comments appear below and in Appendix C.

Results: Fig. 6 shows the best-fitting performance curves for the three groups, and parameter values estimated for each performance curve are given in Table 3. For each family of performance curves, the corresponding parameter α or q increases as the total score decreases, being lowest for the top 30% and highest for the bottom 10% of subjects. This is consistent with natural interpretations of the various strategies, as follows: (i) for MMPCs it implies that poorer performers have a higher presumed uncertainty in delays or SNR; (ii) for RSPCs it implies that they require lower levels of reward, and (iii) for the *RR_m* and *RA* criteria it implies that they place a higher emphasis on accuracy. Note that the best fit for the *RA* theory with the lowest 10% is with q = 1.096, at the constraint limit of Eq. (A.5), and that the corresponding OPC has become concave on either side of its sharp peak.

Comparison of likelihoods of data given different performance curves reveals that the MMPC with uncertainty in delays fits the data best for all three groups of subjects. Table 4 shows the ratios of the likelihood of the data given the MMPC with uncertainty in delays, with likelihoods given each of the other performance curves. For the top 30% of subjects all curves fit comparably well, except the OPC for *RR*. Differences in fit qualities increase significantly for the middle and bottom groups, and are also high when considering the data from *all* subjects, as summarized in the last column of Table 4. These indicate that the data is several

Table 3

Values of performance curve parameters (q or α) estimated using the maximum likelihood method from the data from the three groups of subjects sorted by total earning. For the MMPC with uncertainty in SNR and bottom 10%, the higher the value of α the higher the likelihood of the data. See Table 1 for abbreviations.

Performance curve	Top 30%	Middle 60%	Bottom 10%
MMPC for D	0.22	1.02	5.84
MMPC for SNR	0.19	0.54	∞
RSPC for D	0.72	1.85	8.57
OPC for RR _m	0.14	0.49	0.98
OPC for RA	0.15	0.55	1.096

orders of magnitude more likely given the MMPC with uncertainty in delays, than given the OPC for either RR or RR_m or the MMPC with uncertainty in SNR. It also shows that the data is over 13 (or 43) times more likely given the MMPC with uncertainty in delays, than the RSPC with uncertainty in delays (or the OPC for RA). In summary, the MMPC with uncertainty in delays provides the best fit for all three subgroups, followed closely by the RSPC for delays and the OPC for RA.

At least two effects influence the reliability of the likelihood ratio estimates. First, the test assumes that experimental decision times are normally distributed around the performance curve being fitted. We assessed this in Appendix C, concluding that there is no evidence for non-Gaussianity in the majority of bins, although up to 3 out of the 10 distributions in each group are significantly non-Gaussian, being skewed toward long DTs. Second, likelihood ratios may depend on the way that subjects are split into groups, since we implicitly assume a homogeneous strategy within each group. To investigate this we fitted data from six additional splits, ranging from all 80 individuals treated singly, to two groups of 40 subjects each. As described in Appendix C, while different splits lead to different likelihood ratios, the relative ordering of performance curves remains essentially the same as

Likelihood ratios of the data given the MMPC with uncertainty in *D* compared to other performance curves (rows), for different groups of subjects (columns). The last column is the product of the first three and thus expresses likelihood ratios for all data. The higher the likelihood ratio, the less likely is it that the data could be generated by the corresponding model, in comparison to the MMPC with uncertainty in *D*. To account for the fact that all curves have one free parameter except the OPC, the bottom row includes in brackets the ratio of the likelihood of the data given the two curves divided by exp(1), as suggested by Akaike (1981): see Appendix C. See Table 1 for abbreviations.

Performance curve	Тор 30%	Middle 60%	Bottom 10%	Product
MMPC for SNR	1.13	>10 ⁸	308.38	$> 10^{10}$
RSPC for D	1.99	4.04	1.72	13.82
OPC for RR _m	1.28	38.79	208.47	$> 10^{4}$
OPC for RA	1.11	8.11	4.83	43.48
OPC for RR	47.34 [17.42]	>10 ²¹	$> 10^{6}$	$> 10^{28}$

that of Table 4. We therefore believe that the conclusions drawn above and developed in Section 5, are sound.

We end this section with a brief discussion of the alternative hypothesis noted in Section 2.2, that subjects may try to optimize, but do so using erroneous parameter estimates. As pointed out there, both over- and under-estimation of thresholds would be expected in such a case, yielding individual performances above and below the OPC. We tested this by computing, for each subgroup of subjects, the fraction of individual performances below the OPC. For the top 30% of subjects this is 50.6%, and for the remaining subgroups 25.9% and 0% respectively. Although the individual subject data shows substantial scatter (not shown here), this finding supports our contention that while the top group of subjects may indeed try to optimize, the remaining 70% systematically employ higher thresholds.

5. Discussion

We have developed an approach to two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) tasks that accounts for potential uncertainties in experimental conditions, specifically, estimated delays and signalto-noise ratio. Two strategies - maximin and robust satisficing - were proposed. The former assumes that subjects maximize guaranteed performance under a presumed uncertainty level; the latter assumes that they maximize the uncertainty under which a required level of performance can be guaranteed. We compared these strategies with optimal procedures based on reward rate and modified reward rates weighted for accuracy, and found that the maximin strategy with uncertainties in delays predicts performance curves that best match behavioral data from a group of 80 subjects (Fig. 6). Performance curves predicted by the robust satisficing strategy with uncertainties in delays, and optimization of a modified reward-accuracy rate (RA) are the closest competitors. Additional experiments are needed to further assess which strategy is more consistent with human decision making, as discussed at the end of the section.

The robust strategies result in performance bands around the nominal performance curves. These bands explain well the range of mean normalized decision times observed for a given error rate. We also considered the alternative hypothesis that subjects may try to optimize, but with erroneous parameter estimates. We found it inconsistent with the observation that most subjects tended to perform above rather than below the OPC.

Accounting for uncertainty in the parameters of the pure DD model provides an alternative to the probabilistically-extended DD model that includes trial-to-trial parameter variations (Smith & Ratcliff, 2004). We show that uncertainty in the SNR can be derived from trial-to-trial variations in the drift rate, albeit bounded ones, and thus can also account for differences between response times for correct and error trials. However, unlike those for uncertainties in delays, we find that the resulting performance curves do not match well the experimental data (nor do performance curves for Gaussian-distributed drift rates (Bogacz et al., 2006). This does not mean that trial-to-trial variations in the SNR are absent, but it may imply that the presumed uncertainty in the SNR is much smaller than the presumed uncertainty in delays.

It is notable that uncertainties in delays result in performance curves that fit the data well, while uncertainties in SNR do not do so. A major source of the former may be attributed to the scalar property of interval timing (Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Gibbon, 1977). Psychophysical experiments suggest that elapsed time estimates are distributed normally around the true value, with a standard deviation proportional to it. Thus the sizes of confidence intervals around an estimated experiential delay are proportional to the delay itself. This relationship is captured by the presumed uncertainty set of Section 3.1, and info-gap model of Section 3.2. In contrast to potential uncertainties in estimating time intervals, human subjects seem to be very sensitive to SNR levels. For example, Luijendijk (1994) found that the perception threshold for noise in images was as much as 27 dB below the signal level. This suggests that humans can accurately assess the SNR, although further, more direct, experimental verification would be required.

The underlying assumption in this paper is that subjects either optimize or satisfice by setting their decision thresholds based on estimates of intertrial delays and SNR, as modeled by a DD process. In a related study, Simen et al. (2006) proposed a neural network model for rapid threshold adjustment based on estimates of reward rate *RR* that are updated as trials proceed. Their model relies on prior, long-term, learning of an approximate linear relationship between maximum *RR* and threshold that is independent of SNR over an appropriate SNR range. It too implicitly assumes the ability to estimate time intervals, since the discrete rewards following correct responses must be converted into *RR*, and it also suggests that the SNR may not play as important a role as delays.

As noted in Section 3, satisficing was first introduced by Simon (1956, 1982) to account for decisions motivated by a level of aspiration, rather than optimization. Optimization has been heavily criticized due to its dependence on unrealistic amounts of knowledge and simplifying assumptions (Gigerenzer, 2001). Instead, decision making based on bounded rationality (Gigerenzer, 2001, 2002; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) stresses the importance of proper cues for evaluating different alternatives and heuristics for making fast and frugal decisions. The Take-The-Best heuristic, for example, suggests focusing on the best cue that differentiates between the alternatives. In the context of the DD model Eq. (1), this may suggest monitoring the state variable x(t) as the cue; but the issue of determining the threshold is left open.

We propose two kinds of additional experiments to investigate whether subjects satisfice or optimize in 2AFC: (i) direct investigation of the effects of induced uncertainties, and (ii) correlation of performance in 2AFC with accuracy in interval timing. Uncertainties could be induced by varying the SNRs randomly in each block of trials, although this violates the assumption of statistical stationarity on which the optimality proofs for the SPRT and DD model rely. Alternatively, response-to-stimulus intervals, D_{RSI} , could be drawn from a distribution with a fixed mean \bar{D}_{RSI} , thus keeping the mean \bar{D}_{tot} constant on blocks. \bar{D}_{RSI} and the variance of the distribution could then be changed from block to block and the effects on performance assessed in comparison with the different decision strategies.

Alternatively, a subject's standard deviation in interval timing, σ_I , could be measured directly in separate time-estimation trials, and then correlated with performance on 2AFC tasks. The maximin strategy suggests that the normalized decision time $\langle DT \rangle / D_{tot}$ is proportional to $1 + \alpha_p$. Assuming that the presumed uncertainty α_p is proportional to σ_I , there should be a correlation (across subjects) between $\langle DT \rangle / D_{tot}$'s in 2AFC experiments and average errors in interval timing. One could also correlate timing ability with performance on a deadlined choice task with substantial penalties for failures to respond before the deadline. Unlike the free response paradigm, poor timers are predicted to respond prematurely, and hence *faster and less accurately*, under such conditions (Frazier & Yu, 2007): in the opposite direction to their suboptimal slower and more accurate free response behavior.

The robust satisficing strategy is relevant when a critical performance level must be met, while the maximin strategy is appropriate for optimizing performance under a presumed level of uncertainty. The current results indicate that the majority of subjects in 2AFC tasks seem to follow maximin rather than robust satisficing or optimal performance curves. It would also be interesting to investigate whether subjects change their strategy under different conditions, e.g., do they resort to robust satisficing when the success of the whole block (and the consequent net reward) depends on achieving a specific level of performance. This question could be addressed by additional experiments in which a fixed reward is given when outperforming a preset required level, instead of the current paradigm in which the reward increases linearly with the number of correct responses.

As noted in Section 1, the pure DD model is analytically tractable, yielding explicit, parameter-free OPCs. It supports a normative decision theory that can explain sub-optimal experimental data by allowing analytical derivation of one-parameter models for comparison with the optimal strategy that maximizes reward rate. The current analysis suggests that robust strategies against uncertainties in delays best explain the sub-optimal results in the present data. Nevertheless, additional potential sources of nonoptimality identified in Section 2.1 should also be investigated.

The proofs and mathematical details are given in the Appendices below.

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Appendix A. Reward rate and optimal performance

A.1. Reward rate

Lemma A.1. Let the random variable S_t denote the number of correct decisions in time t. As $t \to \infty$, the mean number of correct decisions per unit time $\langle S_t \rangle / t$ approaches the RR defined by Eq. (4).

Proof. Consider the DD model of Eq. (1), which is re-initialized immediately after crossing the threshold. The resulting passage times define a sequence of points in time, and hence may be

regarded as a realization of a point process. Furthermore, since the first passage time is independent of the previous passage times, the resulting point process can be described as a renewal process (Cox, 1962), i.e., a point process in which intervals between the points are the realizations of a random variable *T* whose pdf depends only on the time since the last point (i.e., last passage time). Let N_t be the random variable indicating the number of passages in time *t*. For a renewal process the asymptotic distribution of N_t for large *t* is normal with mean $\langle N_t \rangle = t/\langle T \rangle$ (Cox, 1962, Eq. (3.3.3)) (this relies on the asymptotic normal distribution of the sum of the first *r* renewals for large *r*). So, for large *t*, $t = \langle T \rangle \langle N_t \rangle$.

Let p(corr) be the probability that a decision be correct. Then, for *n* decisions the mean number of correct decisions is: $\langle S_t | N_t = n \rangle = p(\text{corr}) n$; and the mean number of correct decisions is:

$$\langle S_t \rangle = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \langle S_t | N_t = n \rangle \Pr[N_t = n]$$

= $p(\operatorname{corr}) \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} n \Pr[N_t = n] = p(\operatorname{corr}) \langle N_t \rangle.$ (A.1)

Hence, asymptotically as $t \to \infty$ we have

$$\frac{\langle St \rangle}{t} = \frac{p(\operatorname{corr}) \langle N_t \rangle}{\langle T \rangle \langle N_t \rangle} = \frac{p(\operatorname{corr})}{\langle T \rangle}.$$
(A.2)

The proof is completed by noting that the decision times form a renewal process too, where each decision interval equals the corresponding first passage time plus processing and delay intervals. Substituting p(corr) = 1 - p(err) and $\langle T \rangle = \langle DT \rangle + T_0 + D_{\text{RSI}} + D_{\text{pen}}p(\text{err})$ in Eq. (A.2) results in Eq. (4).

A.2. Families of OPCs for alternative objective functions RA and RR_m

Employing Eqs. (3) and an analog of (6) as in Section 2.2, the expression (8) for *RA* may be maximized to yield a family of OPCs parameterized by q:

$$\frac{\langle DT \rangle}{D_{\text{tot}}} = \frac{\mathcal{E} - 2q - \sqrt{\mathcal{E}^2 - 4q(\mathcal{E} + 1)}}{2q},\tag{A.3}$$

where
$$\mathcal{E} = \left[\frac{1}{p(\text{err})\log\left(\frac{1-p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})}\right)} + \frac{1}{1-2p(\text{err})}\right]$$
 (A.4)

is the reciprocal of the OPC for *RR* given by (7). In Lemma A.2 below we prove that \mathcal{E} has a unique minimum (and hence that the OPC for *RR* has a unique peak) at $p(\text{err}) \approx 0.1741$. It follows that the mean normalized decision times given by Eq. (A.3) are non-negative real numbers provided that the weight satisfies the following inequality:

$$q \le \min\left\{\frac{\mathcal{E}^2}{4(\mathcal{E}+1)}\right\} = \frac{\mathcal{E}^2_{\min}}{4(\mathcal{E}_{\min}+1)}.$$
(A.5)

Numerically, we find $\mathcal{E}_{\min} \approx 5.224$, implying that $q \leq 1.096$. Moreover, differentiating the expression in (A.3)–(A.4) with respect to p(err), we find that its critical points coincide with the minimum of \mathcal{E} for all q satisfying (A.5), implying that the the OPCs for RA all peak at $p(\text{err}) \approx 0.1741$, as for RR.

A similar computation for the objective function (9) for RR_m leads to the following OPC family:

$$\frac{\langle DT \rangle}{D_{\text{tot}}} = (1+q) \left[\frac{\frac{1}{p(\text{err})} - \frac{q}{1-p(\text{err})}}{\log\left(\frac{1-p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})}\right)} + \frac{1-q}{1-2p(\text{err})} \right]^{-1}, \quad (A.6)$$

whose mean normalized decision times are non-negative provided that $q \leq 1$. Unlike the OPCs for *RA*, the maxima of the family (A.6) move rightward with increasing *q* (Fig. 6). Eqs. (A.3) and (A.6) both reduce to (7) for q = 0.

Lemma A.2. The function \mathcal{E} of Eq. (A.4) has a unique minimum $\mathcal{E} \approx 5.224$ at ER ≈ 0.1741 and \mathcal{E} approaches $+\infty$ as ER $\rightarrow 0$ and as ER $\rightarrow 0.5$.

Proof. The limits at ER = 0 and 0.5 are obtained directly for the second term in \mathcal{E} , and via L'Hôpital's rule for the term involving logarithms. Before computing the derivative to prove that there is a unique minimum, it is convenient to change variables by defining

$$y = \frac{1 - p(\text{err})}{p}(\text{err}) \Rightarrow p(\text{err}) = \frac{1}{1 + y};$$
(A.7)

note that as p(err) rises from 0 to 0.5, y falls monotonically from $+\infty$ to 1. We then have

$$\frac{d\mathcal{E}}{dy} = \frac{d}{dy} \left[\frac{y+1}{\log(y)} + \frac{y+1}{y-1} \right] \\ = \frac{\log(y) - 1 - y^{-1}}{[\log(y)]^2} - \frac{2}{(y-1)^2}.$$
(A.8)

Setting Eq. (A.8) equal to zero and rearranging, we find that critical points of $\mathcal E$ occur at the roots of

$$\log(y) - y^{-1} = 1 + 2 \left[\frac{\log(y)}{y - 1} \right]^2,$$
(A.9)

but in fact the solution is unique, since the left hand side of (A.9) is strictly increasing from -1 to ∞ and its right hand monotonically decreases from 2 to 1, as *y* goes from 1 to ∞ . The former claim is easy to check, and the latter follows from computation of the derivative of $[\log(y)/(y-1)]$:

$$\frac{d}{dy} \left[\frac{\log(y)}{y-1} \right] = \frac{1 - y^{-1} - \log(y)}{(y-1)^2}.$$
(A.10)

This expression is clearly negative for all $y \ge e$, and the following series expansion shows that it is in fact negative for all y > 1 and zero only at y = 1:

$$\log(y) = \sum_{j=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{j} \left(\frac{y-1}{y}\right)^j = 1 - y^{-1} + \sum_{j=2}^{\infty} \frac{1}{j} \left(\frac{y-1}{y}\right)^j, \quad (A.11)$$

see Abramowitz (1972, Formula 4.1.25). Numerical solution of Eq. (A.9) yields the estimates of the lemma. \Box

Appendix B. Robust performance

B.1. Extreme performance under uncertainties in delays

The worst (minimal) reward rate that may occur under the presumed uncertainty set $U_p(\alpha_p : \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ for the delays, is denoted by: $RR_{MIN}(\alpha_p : \theta, \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) \equiv \min_{D,D_{tot} \in U_p(\alpha_p; \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})} RR(\theta : \eta, D, D_{tot})$. According to Eq. (5), the *RR* is minimized when the actual delays are the longest possible within the presumed uncertainty set. Given the presumed uncertainty set of Eq. (10), the longest possible delays are $D = \tilde{D}(1 + \alpha_p)$ and $D_{tot} = \tilde{D}_{tot}(1 + \alpha_p)$, so:

$$RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p : \theta, \eta, D, D_{\text{tot}}) = \left[\theta + \tilde{D}(1 + \alpha_p) + [\tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}(1 + \alpha_p) - \theta] \exp(-2\eta\theta)\right]^{-1}.$$
 (B.1)

We note that when there are no delays, the reward rate, denoted by RR_0 , is $RR_0(\theta, \eta) \equiv [\theta(1 - \exp(-2\eta\theta))]^{-1}$.

Similarly, the best performance (maximum *RR*) that can be obtained is denoted as: $RR_{MAX}(\alpha_p : \theta, \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) \equiv \max_{D,D_{tot} \in U_p(\alpha_p;\tilde{D},\tilde{D}_{tot})} RR(\theta : \eta, D, D_{tot})$. According to Eq. (5), *RR* is maximized when the actual delays are the shortest, i.e., when $D = \max(0, \tilde{D}(1-\alpha))$ and $D_{tot} = \max(0, \tilde{D}_{tot}(1-\alpha))$. For $\alpha \leq 1$, we have:

$$RR_{MAX}(\alpha_p \leq 1: \theta, \eta, D, D_{tot})$$

$$= \left[\theta + \tilde{D}(1 - \alpha_p) + [\tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}(1 - \alpha_p) - \theta] \exp(-2\eta\theta)\right]^{-1}.$$
 (B.2)

The case $\alpha \geq 1$ includes the favorable condition of zero delays, so $RR_{MAX}(\alpha_p \geq 1 : \theta, \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) = RR_0(\theta, \eta).$

B.2. Maximin performance curves under uncertainties in delays

Here we prove Theorem 3.1. Specifically, we develop the maximin performance curves (MMPC) given that the uncertainties in the delays are described by the presumed uncertainty set of Eq. (10) with the presumed level of uncertainty α_p .

Proof of Theorem 3.1. The inner minimization in Eq. (11) specifies the worst reward rate that might be obtained using the threshold θ , given the uncertainty set of Eq. (10) and the presumed level of uncertainty α_p . The worst (minimal) reward rate RR_{MIN} , is derived in Appendix B.1, and given by Eq. (B.1). The maximin threshold θ_{MM} should maximize Eq. (B.1). Differentiating the $RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p : \theta, \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}})$ given by Eq. (B.1) with respect to θ and setting this derivative to zero results in the following condition for the maximin threshold θ_{MM} :

$$\exp(2\eta\theta_{MM}) - 1 = 2\eta[D_{tot}(1+\alpha_p) - \theta_{MM}].$$
(B.3)

It is straightforward to verify that when this condition holds, the second derivative is negative, and hence condition Eq. (B.3) defines a unique maximum for the worst reward rate, RR_{MIN} .

Finally, substituting Eq. (3) in Eq. (B.3), and setting $\gamma \equiv \frac{D_{\text{tot}}}{D_{\text{tot}}}$ results in the maximin performance curve (MMPC) of Eq. (12).

B.3. Maximin performance curves for uncertainties in noise variance

Here we consider uncertainties in the SNR that arise from uncertainties in the noise variance. Thus, the uncertainty set for the SNR, specified by Eq. (13), is assumed to reflect uncertainties in the noise variance, while the drift rate *A* in each experimental block is assumed fixed and known. In this case, determining the threshold-to-drift ratio θ unambiguously defines the threshold $x_{\text{th}} = A\theta$ for the DD process of Eq. (1).

Definition B.1. Maximin threshold-to-drift ratio under uncertainties in the SNR: The maximin threshold-to-drift ratio θ_{MM} is the one that maximizes the worst *RR* under the presumed level of uncertainty α_p in the SNR, given the delays and nominal SNR:

$$\theta_{MM}(\alpha_p:\tilde{\eta}, D, D_{tot}) = \arg \max_{\theta} \left(\min_{\eta \in U_p(\alpha_p, \tilde{\eta})} RR(\theta:\eta, D, D_{tot}) \right).$$
(B.4)

Theorem B.1. Maximin threshold-to-drift ratio under uncertainties in SNR: Given the presumed uncertainty set given by Eq. (13) with $\alpha_p \leq 1$, the maximin threshold-to-drift θ_{MM} satisfies:

$$\exp(2\tilde{\eta}(1-\alpha_p)\theta_{MM}) - 1 = 2\tilde{\eta}(1-\alpha_p)(D_{\text{tot}} - \theta_{MM}).$$
(B.5)

Proof. The inner minimization in Eq. (B.4) specifies the worst reward rate that may occur under the presumed uncertainty set $U_p(\alpha_p, \tilde{\eta})$ for the SNR, and is denoted by: $RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p : \theta, \tilde{\eta}, D, \theta)$

 $D_{\text{tot}} \equiv \min_{\eta \in U_p(\alpha_p; \tilde{\eta})} RR(\theta : \eta, D, D_{\text{tot}})$. According to Eq. (5), the minimization of the *RR* with respect to η depends on the sign of $D_{\text{tot}} - \theta$. We note that for the optimal threshold, Eq. (6) implies that $D_{\text{tot}} - \theta_{\text{op}} > 0$.

First, we consider thresholds that satisfy $D_{tot} - \theta > 0$, for which *RR* is minimized at the lowest SNR, i.e., $\eta_L = \max\{0, (1 - \alpha_p)\tilde{\eta}\}$, so for $\alpha_p \leq 1$:

$$RR_{MIN}(\alpha_p \le 1:\theta,\tilde{\eta}, D, D_{tot}) = \left[\theta + D + (D_{tot} - \theta)\exp(-2\tilde{\eta}(1 - \alpha_p)\theta)\right]^{-1}.$$
(B.6)

The case $\alpha_p \geq 1$ includes the worst condition of zero SNR. The resulting performance $RR_{MIN}(\alpha_p \geq 1 : \theta, \tilde{\eta}, D, D_{tot}) = [D + D_{tot}]^{-1}$, corresponding to instant response at chance level (i.e., with p(err) = 0.5 cf. Eq. (2)), is referred to as *chance performance* and denoted by $RR_{chance} \equiv [D + D_{tot}]^{-1}$. Chance performance can be achieved even under infinite uncertainty, and is thus of no interest.

Concentrating on $\alpha_p \leq 1$, we note that for either $\theta = 0$ or $\theta = D_{\text{tot}}$, the worst reward rate is the chance level: $RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p \leq 1 : \theta = 0, \tilde{\eta}, D, D_{\text{tot}}) = RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p \leq 1 : \theta + D_{\text{tot}}, \tilde{\eta}, D, D_{\text{tot}}) = RR_{\text{chance}}$. Furthermore, at $\theta = 0$, the derivative of $RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p \leq 1 : \theta, \tilde{\eta}, D, D_{\text{tot}})$ with respect to θ is positive, and hence there is at least a local maximum of Eq. (B.6) for thresholds in the range $0 < \theta < D_{\text{tot}}$. Differentiating Eq. (B.6) with respect to θ , and setting the derivative to zero, indicates that θ_{MM} must satisfy Eq. (B.5). It is straightforward to verify that $RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p \leq 1 : \theta_{\text{MM}}, \tilde{\eta}, D, D_{\text{tot}})$ is a maximum by evaluating the second derivative at θ_{MM} that satisfies Eq. (B.5).

For large thresholds that satisfy $D_{\text{tot}} - \theta < 0$, the *RR* is minimized at the highest SNR, i.e., $\eta_H = (1 + \alpha_p)\tilde{\eta}$, so:

$$RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p : \theta, \tilde{\eta}, D, D_{\text{tot}}) = \left[\theta + D + (D_{\text{tot}} - \theta) \exp(-2\tilde{\eta}(1 + \alpha_p)\theta)\right]^{-1}.$$
 (B.7)

Noting that the last term is always negative, and that since $\alpha_p \ge 0$, the exponent is always less than unity, i.e., $(\exp(-2\tilde{\eta}(1 + \alpha_p)\theta) < 1)$, we conclude that $RR_{\text{MIN}}(\alpha_p : \theta, \tilde{\eta}, D, D_{\text{tot}}) < [\theta + D + (D_{\text{tot}} - \theta)]^{-1} = RR_{\text{chance}}$. As argued above, sub-chance performance levels, i.e., $RR < RR_{\text{chance}}$, can be achieved even under infinite uncertainty, and are thus of no interest. \Box

When the presumed level of uncertainty is zero, Eq. (B.5) for the maximin threshold-to-drift ratio reduces to Eq. (6) for the optimum threshold.

Assuming that the nominal SNR is the actual SNR ($\eta = \tilde{\eta}$), the nominal MMPC for a presumed level of uncertainty $\alpha_p \leq 1$ in the SNR, can be derived by substituting Eq. (3) in Eq. (B.5):

$$\frac{\langle DT \rangle}{D_{\text{tot}}} = [1 - 2p(\text{err})] \left[\frac{\left(\frac{1 - p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})}\right)^{\chi} - 1}{\chi \log\left(\frac{1 - p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})}\right)} + 1 \right]^{-1}, \quad (B.8)$$

where $\chi \equiv 1 - \alpha_p$. Under uncertainties in the SNR, the MMPCs are not scaled version of the OPC (Eq. (7)), but reduce to it when the uncertainty vanishes ($\chi = 1$).

If the SNR varies within the range consistent with the presumed level of uncertainty, i.e., $\eta \in [\tilde{\eta}(1 - \alpha_p), \tilde{\eta}(1 + \alpha_p)]$ for $\alpha_p \leq 1$, the maximin performance bands are bounded below (for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}(1 - \alpha_p)$) by the OPC (Eq. (7)), and above (for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}(1 + \alpha_p)$) by Eq. (B.8) with $\chi = \frac{1 - \alpha_p}{1 + \alpha_n}$.

B.4. Maximin performance curves under uncertainties in drift rate

Here we consider uncertain drift rates. In this case, specifying the threshold-to-drift ratio $\theta \equiv |x_{\rm th}/A|$ does not specify the process threshold $x_{\rm th}$ unambiguously, since the latter depends on the uncertain drift rate. Instead we introduce the threshold-to-noise ratio $\vartheta \equiv |x_{\rm th}/\sigma|$. Assuming that the noise variance σ^2 is fixed and known, determining the threshold-to-variance ratio ϑ unambiguously defines the process threshold $x_{\rm th}$ for the drift-diffusion process of Eq. (1). Note that $\vartheta = \theta \sqrt{\eta}$, so the quantities describing performance: p(err) and $\langle DR \rangle$ in Eq. (2) and RR in Eq. (5), can be expressed in terms of ϑ and η in place of θ and η . In particular, the reward rate can be expressed as a function of η and ϑ :

 $RR(\vartheta:\eta, D, D_{tot})$

$$= \left[\frac{\vartheta}{\sqrt{\eta}} + D + \left(D_{\text{tot}} - \frac{\vartheta}{\sqrt{\eta}}\right) \exp\left(-2\sqrt{\eta}\vartheta\right)\right]^{-1}.$$
 (B.9)

Definition B.2. Maximin threshold-to-noise ratio under uncertainties in SNR: The maximin threshold-to-noise ratio ϑ_{MM} is the threshold that maximizes the worst *RR* under the presumed uncertainty set $U_p(\alpha_p, \tilde{\eta})$ for the SNR, given the level of uncertainty α_p , the delays, *D* and *D*_{tot}, and the nominal SNR, $\tilde{\eta}$:

$$\vartheta_{MM}(\alpha_p:\tilde{\eta}, D, D_{\text{tot}})$$

= $\arg \max_{\vartheta} \left(\min_{\eta \in U_p(\alpha_p, \tilde{\eta})} RR(\vartheta: \eta, D, D_{\text{tot}}) \right).$ (B.10)

Theorem B.2. Maximin threshold-to-noise ratio under uncertainties in SNR: Given the presumed uncertainty set for the SNR given by Eq. (13), with a presumed level of uncertainty $\alpha_p \leq 1$, the maximin threshold-to-noise ϑ_{MM} satisfies:

$$\exp\left(2\sqrt{\tilde{\eta}(1-\alpha_p)}\vartheta_{MM}\right) - 1$$
$$= 2\tilde{\eta}(1-\alpha_p)\left(D_{\text{tot}} - \frac{\vartheta_{MM}}{\sqrt{\tilde{\eta}(1-\alpha_p)}}\right). \tag{B.11}$$

Proof. For a fixed ϑ , the reward rate given by Eq. (B.9) is an increasing function of η , and hence its minimum occurs at the lowest SNR consistent with the presumed uncertainty $\alpha_p \leq 1$, i.e., $\eta_L = (1 - \alpha_p)\tilde{\eta}$. The maximin threshold-to-noise variance, defined by Eq. (B.10), is obtained by substituting the lowest SNR in Eq. (B.9), differentiating with respect to ϑ , and equating to zero. \Box

As in Appendix B.3, the case $\alpha_p \ge 1$ includes the worst case of zero SNR, which results in chance performance, which is of no further interest.

Given $\tilde{\eta}$, the threshold-to-noise ratio is related to the thresholdto-drift ratio by $\vartheta = \theta \sqrt{\eta}$. Thus, the expression for θ in Eq. (3) can be used to express ϑ_{MM} , and consequently the condition in Eq. (B.11), in terms of the two performance parameters, p(err) and $\langle DT \rangle$, and the nominal SNR, $\tilde{\eta}$. Assuming that the actual SNR equals the nominal SNR ($\eta = \tilde{\eta}$), the latter can also be expressed in the terms of the performance parameters to derive the nominal MMPC for a fixed level of presumed uncertainty $\alpha_p \leq 1$ in the SNR:

$$\frac{\langle DT \rangle}{D_{\text{tot}}} = \sqrt{\chi} (1 - 2p(\text{err})) \left[\frac{\left(\frac{1 - p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})}\right)^{\sqrt{\chi}} - 1}{\sqrt{\chi} \log\left(\frac{1 - p(\text{err})}{p(\text{err})}\right)} + 1 \right]^{-1}, \quad (B.12)$$

where, as in Eq. (B.8), $\chi \equiv 1 - \alpha_p$.

If the SNR varies within the range consistent with the presumed level of uncertainty, i.e., $\eta \in [\tilde{\eta}(1 - \alpha_p), \tilde{\eta}(1 + \alpha_p)]$ for $\alpha_p \leq 1$,

the maximin performance bands are bounded by the OPC (Eq. (7), obtained for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}(1 - \alpha_p)$) and by Eq. (B.12) with $\chi = \frac{1 - \alpha_p}{1 + \alpha_p}$ (for $\eta = \tilde{\eta}(1 + \alpha_p)$).

B.5. Performance under uncertain and variable drift rate

Here we prove Theorem 3.2, which states that for a fixed threshold-to-noise ratio, the worst performance with a sequence of possibly variable SNRs, within the presumed uncertainty set defined by Eq. (14), is the same as that for a fixed SNR within the presumed uncertainty set defined by Eq. (13), under the same level of presumed uncertainty α_p .

Proof of Theorem 3.2. Consider a 2AFC task where the SNR at the *i*th trial is the *i*th element in an infinite sequence $\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$ consistent with the presumed uncertainty set of Eq. (14). Given the presumed level of uncertainty α_p the lowest SNR consistent with that uncertainty set is given by $\eta_w = \max(0, (1 - \alpha)\tilde{\eta})$.

Let $p(\eta : \vartheta)$ be the probability of error in a 2AFC with a fixed SNR η using the threshold-to-noise ratio ϑ . Noting that $\eta\theta = \sqrt{\eta}\vartheta$, it follows from Eq. (2), that:

$$p(\eta:\vartheta) = \frac{1}{1 + \exp(2\sqrt{\eta}\vartheta)}.$$
(B.13)

When the SNR varies from trial-to-trial according to a specific sequence $\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$, the probability of error in a 2AFC experiment of fixed duration is a random variable P_{err} , which depends on the number of trials in the experiment. Let P(n) denote the probability of having *n* trials in the fixed duration of the experiment, the mean P_{err} (see pp. 763–4 of Bogacz et al. (2006), and Gold and Shadlen (2002)) is:

$$\langle P_{\rm err}(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^\infty:\vartheta)\rangle = \sum_{n=0}^\infty \frac{P(n)}{n} \left(\sum_{i=1}^n p(\eta_i:\vartheta)\right). \tag{B.14}$$

Since $p(\eta : \vartheta)$ given in Eq. (B.13) is a decreasing function of η , the mean P_{err} can only increase by replacing each η_i with η_w :

$$\langle P_{\text{err}}(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}:\vartheta)\rangle \leq \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{P(n)}{n} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} p(\eta_w:\vartheta)\right)$$

= $p(\eta_w:\vartheta),$ (B.15)

which is the probability of error with a fixed SNR η_w .

Similarly, let $\langle DT(\eta : \vartheta) \rangle$ be the mean response time in a 2AFC with a fixed SNR η using the threshold-to-noise ratio ϑ . Noting that $\theta = \vartheta / \sqrt{\eta}$, it follows from Eq. (2), that:

$$\langle DT(\eta:\vartheta)\rangle = \frac{\vartheta}{\sqrt{\eta}} \frac{\exp(2\sqrt{\eta}\vartheta) - 1}{\exp(2\sqrt{\eta}\vartheta) + 1},$$
 (B.16)

which is a decreasing function of η (as proved in Lemma B.1 at the end of this appendix).

The mean response time with the sequence of SNRs $\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}$ is (Gold & Shadlen, 2002):

$$\langle DT(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}:\vartheta)\rangle = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{P(n)}{n} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \langle DT(\eta_i:\vartheta)\rangle \right).$$
 (B.17)

Since $\langle DT(\eta_i : \vartheta) \rangle$ given by Eq. (B.16) is a decreasing function of η , the mean response time with a sequence of SNRs $\langle DT(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty} : \vartheta) \rangle$ can only increase by replacing each η_i with η_w :

$$\langle DT(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty} : \vartheta) \rangle \leq \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \frac{P(n)}{n} \left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \langle DT(\eta_w : \vartheta) \rangle \right)$$

= $\langle DT(\eta_w : \vartheta) \rangle,$ (B.18)

which is the mean response time with a fixed SNR η_w .

The *RR*, given by the ratio between the probability of a correct response and the average time between responses:

$$RR(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^\infty:\vartheta)$$

$$=\frac{1-\langle P_{\rm err}(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}:\vartheta)\rangle}{\langle DT(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}:\vartheta)\rangle+D+(D-D_{\rm tot})\langle P_{\rm err}(\{\eta_i\}_{i=1}^{\infty}:\vartheta)\rangle}, \quad (B.19)$$

is a decreasing function of both $\langle P_{\text{err}}({\eta_i}_{i=1}^{\infty} : \vartheta) \rangle$ and $\langle DT({\eta_i}_{i=1}^{\infty} : \vartheta) \rangle$. According to Eqs. (B.15) and (B.18), both of these terms are maximized simultaneously when the SNR is fixed at its worst level, η_w . Hence, when the SNR may vary from trial-to-trial according to a sequence ${\eta_i}_{i=1}^{\infty}$ consistent with the presumed uncertainty set of Eq. (14), the worst performance is obtained when $\eta_i = \eta_w$. This performance is the same as the worst performance for a fixed SNR within the presumed uncertainty set of Eq. (13), for the same level of uncertainty α_p . \Box

Lemma B.1. The function $\langle DT(\eta|\vartheta) \rangle = \frac{\vartheta}{\sqrt{\eta}} \frac{\exp(2\sqrt{\eta}\vartheta) - 1}{\exp(2\sqrt{\eta}\vartheta) + 1}$ is a decreasing function of η .

Proof. The derivative of $\langle DT(\eta|\vartheta) \rangle$ is given in Box I: Using a Taylor series to expand the exponent and noting that for n > 3, $2n < 2^n$, we may conclude that $2y \exp(y) + 1 < \exp(2y)$. Substituting $y = 2\sqrt{\eta}\vartheta$ indicates that the above derivative is negative, thereby completing the proof. \Box

B.6. Robustness to uncertainties in delays

This section defines and derives the robustness of a 2AFC task for achieving the required reward rate under uncertainties in the delays.

Definition B.3. *Robustness of a 2AFC task to uncertainties in delays:* Consider a 2AFC task with uncertainties in the delays specified by an info-gap model. Given a threshold θ , the *robustness* $\hat{\alpha}$ is the greatest level of uncertainty in the info-gap model $U(\alpha, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ for which the required reward rate $R_r \leq RR(\theta : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ can be guaranteed:

$$\hat{\alpha}(R_r, \theta : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) = \max\left\{ \alpha \left| \left(\min_{D, D_{tot} \in U(\alpha, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})} RR(\theta, \eta, D, D_{tot}) \right) \ge R_r \right\}.$$
 (B.20)

The upper limit on the required reward rate, $RR(\theta : \eta, \hat{D}, \hat{D}_{tot})$, is the nominal reward rate that can be achieved using the threshold θ with the nominal delays, \tilde{D} and \tilde{D}_{tot} , and the SNR, η , i.e., Eq. (5) with the nominal delays. The robustness for achieving a better than nominal reward rate is zero.

The robustness depends on the structure of the info-gap model. Given the specific info-gap model of Eq. (15), the robustness against uncertainties in the delays can be derived as specified in the next theorem.

Theorem B.3. Robustness of a 2AFC task to uncertainties in the delays: Consider a 2AFC task with uncertainties in the delays specified by the info-gap model of Eq. (15). Given the nominal delays, \tilde{D} and \tilde{D}_{tot} , and the SNR, η , the robustness for achieving the required performance R_r with the threshold θ is given by:

$$\hat{\alpha}(R_r, \theta : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) = \max\left\{0, \frac{1/R_r - \theta(1 - \exp(-2\eta\theta))}{\tilde{D} + \tilde{D}_{tot}\exp(-2\eta\theta)} - 1\right\}.$$
(B.21)

Proof. The internal minimization in Eq. (B.20) is derived in Appendix B.1 for the presumed level of uncertainty, i.e., for $\alpha = \alpha_p$,



and expressed in Eq. (B.1). For a general level of uncertainty α , Eq. (B.1) implies that the internal inequality in Eq. (B.20) can be expressed as:

$$\theta + \tilde{D}(1+\alpha) + [\tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}(1+\alpha) - \theta] \exp(-2\eta\theta) \le R_r^{-1}.$$
(B.22)

The robustness $\hat{\alpha}$ is the level of uncertainty α for which equality holds, and thus given by Eq. (B.21). \Box

Eqs. (5) and (B.21) imply that the robustness for achieving the nominal performance is zero, i.e., $\hat{\alpha}(R_r = RR(\theta : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}), \theta : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) = 0$. In particular, the optimal nominal performance $RR(\theta_o p : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ (i.e., Eq. (4) for the optimal threshold under nominal delays) has zero robustness. Only lower reward rates $R_r < RR(\theta : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) \leq RR(\theta_{op} : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$, can be attained robustly. Robustness to uncertainties requires relinquishing performance.

B.7. Robust satisficing under uncertainties in delays

This section specifies the robust-satisficing strategy and derives the resulting performance curves under uncertainties in the delays.

Eq. (B.20) implies that sub-optimal reward rates have positive robustness to uncertainties in the delays. The robust-satisficing strategy seeks the threshold θ_{RS} that provides maximum robustness for required reward rates that are sub-optimal, as defined below:

Definition B.4. *Robust-satisficing threshold under uncertainties in the delays:* Consider a 2AFC task with SNR, η , and nominal delays, \tilde{D} and \tilde{D}_{tot} . Given the required sub-optimal performance, R_r , the robust-satisficing threshold, θ_{RS} , maximizes the robustness for achieving R_r under uncertainties in delays:

$$\theta_{\text{RS}}(R_r:\eta,\tilde{D},\tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}) = \arg\max_{\alpha}\hat{\alpha}(R_r,\theta:\eta,\tilde{D},\tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}).$$
(B.23)

Robust-satisficing under uncertainties in the delays imposes a strict condition on the threshold θ_{RS} as stated in the next theorem.

Theorem B.4. Robust-satisficing threshold under uncertainties in the delays: Consider a 2AFC task with uncertainties in the delays specified by the info-gap model of Eq. (15). Given the nominal delays, \tilde{D} and \tilde{D}_{tot} , the SNR, η , and the sub-optimal required reward rate $R_r < RR_{op}(\eta : \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$, the robust satisficing threshold θ_{RS} satisfies:

$$2\eta \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}} R_r^{-1} = [2\eta \theta_{RS} + \exp(2\eta \theta_{RS}) - 1]\tilde{D} + [2\eta \theta_{RS} - \exp(-2\eta \theta_{RS}) + 1]\tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}.$$
 (B.24)

Proof. For a fixed level of required performance R_r , consider the interval of threshold values for which the nominal reward rate is higher than required, i.e., threshold values for which $R_r < RR(\theta, \eta : \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$. This is a single (connected) interval since RR as a function of the threshold has a single global maximum, as noted following Eq. (6). Within this interval the robustness is positive and given by the second term in Eq. (B.21). The boundaries of the interval are defined by $R_r = RR(\theta, \eta : \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ - at which the robustness is zero; or by $\theta = 0$ at the lower boundary. In the latter case, the

derivative of the robustness with respect to the threshold at $\theta = 0$ is positive. Since the robustness within the interval is higher than at the boundaries, there must be at least one maximum within this interval. The derivative of the right term in Eq. (B.21) with respect to θ can be expressed as

$$\frac{\partial \hat{\alpha}(R_r, \theta : \eta, D, D_{\text{tot}})}{\partial \theta} = \frac{g(\theta, \eta : R_r, D, D_{\text{tot}}) \exp(-2\eta\theta)}{\left(\tilde{D} + \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}} \exp(-2\eta\theta)\right)^2}, \quad (B.25)$$

where

$$g(\theta, \eta : R_r, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) = \frac{2\eta D_{tot}}{R_r} - [2\eta\theta + \exp(2\eta\theta) - 1]\tilde{D} - [2\eta\theta - \exp(-2\eta\theta) + 1]\tilde{D}_{tot}.$$
 (B.26)

Hence, extrema of $\hat{\alpha}(R_r, \theta : \eta, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ as a function of θ satisfy $g(\theta, \eta : R_r, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) = 0$. It is straightforward to verify that when the latter equality holds, the second derivative of the robustness is negative. Thus $g(\theta, \eta : R_r, \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot}) = 0$ defines a unique maximum and, according to Eq. (B.26), the robust-satisficing threshold that satisfies this equality must obey Eq. (B.24). \Box

Substituting Eq. (3) in Eq. (B.24), specifies the *robust-satisficing* performance curve (RSPC) that describes the tradeoff between speed ($\langle DT \rangle / \tilde{D}_{tot}$) and accuracy (1 - p(err)) that must hold in order to robust-satisfice the required performance R_r :

 $\frac{\langle DT \rangle}{\tilde{D}_{tot}}$

$$= \frac{R_r^{-1}}{\tilde{D}_{tot}} \left[\frac{\tilde{D}/\tilde{D}_{tot} + p(err)(1 - \tilde{D}/\tilde{D}_{tot})}{p(err)(1 - p(err))\log\left(\frac{1 - p(err)}{p(err)}\right)} + \frac{\tilde{D}/\tilde{D}_{tot} + 1}{1 - 2p(err)} \right]^{-1}.$$
 (B.27)

Note that this expression does not reduce to a scaled OPC Eq. (7) even when the actual delays equal the nominal values ($D = \tilde{D}$ and $D_{\text{tot}} = \tilde{D}_{\text{tot}}$), or when there is no penalty delay ($\tilde{D}_{\text{tot}} = \tilde{D}$). The RSPCs have a different shape.

The RSPCs depend on the ratio $\tilde{D}/\tilde{D}_{tot}$, so for comparison with experimental data, this ratio must be determined or related to the actual ratio D/D_{tot} . When no penalty delay is used, $D_{pen} = 0$, and the ratio is one. The corresponding RSPCs are specified by Eq. (B.27) with $\tilde{D}/\tilde{D}_{tot} = 1$:

We note that the constraint on the required performance $R_r < RR_{op}(\eta : \tilde{D}, \tilde{D}_{tot})$ implies that the RSPCs lie above the OPC. However, it is possible to extend Eqs. (B.24) and (B.27) below the OPC, as briefly outlined here. While better than optimal reward rates cannot be guaranteed, they may nevertheless occur under favorable conditions, which are made increasingly possible as the level of uncertainty increases. The minimum level of uncertainty which makes it possible to get a desired reward rate is defined as the opportuneness, and the opportunity facilitating strategy selects the threshold with minimum opportuneness for the desired reward rate. The resulting performance curves follow the above equations below the OPC. Since this region is only marginally important for the current paper (the RSPCs in Fig. 6

Table C.1

Likelihood ratios of the data given MMPC with uncertainty in D and given other performance curves (rows), for different splits of subjects into groups (columns). The higher
the likelihood ratio, the less likely is it that the data could be generated by the corresponding model, in comparison to the MMPC for D. See Table 1 for abbreviations.

Performance curve	Individual	20 groups	10 groups	5 groups	4 groups	2 groups
MMPC for SNR	> 10 ¹³	> 10 ¹⁰	> 109	$> 10^{10}$	>10 ¹⁰	>10 ⁸
RSPC for D	1.96	42.00	29.26	8.28	7.86	9.61
OPC for <i>RR_m</i>	471.54	>10 ⁵	>10 ⁵	522.09	316.03	59.16
OPC for RA	$> 10^{6}$	482.05	70.52	3.33	8.82	3.96
OPC for RR	>10 ⁵⁹	>1033	$> 10^{29}$	>10 ²⁶	>10 ²⁴	$> 10^{20}$

are mostly above the OPC) the opportunity facilitating strategy is not developed further in this paper, (but see Ben-Haim (2006) and Zacksenhouse, Nemets, Lebedev and Nicolelis (2009) for more details).

Appendix C. The likelihood ratio test and the influence of subgroup sizes

Here we provide further details on the reliability of the statistics used in Section 4. We first address the assumption that the data are normally distributed. For each subgroup of subjects and each p(err)bin, we tested the distribution of normalized decision times for Gaussianity using the Jarque–Bera (Judge, Hill, Griffiths, Lutkepohl, & Lee, 1988) and Lilliefors (Conover, 1980) tests, obtaining the following numbers of significantly non-Gaussian p(err) bins for both tests, at a significance level of 0.05. Among the top 30% and 30%-60% groups: 3 bins in each group; among the 60%-90% group: 2 bins; among the bottom 10% group no significantly non-Gaussian bins were found. When the 30%-60% and 60%-90% groups are combined into a single group as in Section 4, the number of significantly non-Gaussian p(err) bins rises to 6, probably due to the fact that some subjects in this large group employ different decision strategies, a point that we address further below. (There are 250 data points in this middle group, compared with 125 in the top 30% and 42% in the bottom 10% groups, cf. Table 2.)

When comparing two nested models, i.e., a complex model and a simple model to which the complex one can be reduced, the likelihood ratio test can be used to determine whether the data is significantly less likely under the simple rather than the complex model. This is the case when comparing the MMPC with uncertainty in D with the OPC for RR, to which the former reduces by fixing $\alpha = 0$. The likelihood ratio test shows that the MMPC with uncertainties in D provides a significantly better description of the data for the top 30% of subjects (p < 0.01), and for both the other groups ($p \approx 0$). Except for the OPC for RR, all the other PCs are based on non-nested models with a single free parameter each. The corresponding likelihood ratio between the MMPC with uncertainties in D and each of these models (first four rows Table 4) provides a reasonable criterion for assessing whether the former explains the data better. A more rigorous comparison using the Bayesian approach would require additional assumptions on prior probabilities of the parameters q and α : see, e.g. MacKay (2003).

As noted in Section 4, in fitting performance curves to data from subgroups of subjects divided according to the total rewards accrued, we implicitly assume that all members of each given subgroup employ a common decision strategy. Here we probe the validity of this assumption by considering six additional ways of splitting the data. We first fitted all performance curves to the data from each subject separately and computed the average likelihood ratio for each pair of curves, as a product of likelihood ratios for the 80 individuals, obtaining the entries in the first column of Table C.1. This split avoids the assumption of a common strategy, but the ratios are unreliable because individual subject data are very noisy and some bins contain as few as 3 data points, leading to overfitting. This is reflected in the fact that the entries of column 1 differ substantially from those of the other columns in Table C.1.

This analysis was repeated five times to produce the remaining columns of Table C.1, by successively dividing the subjects (sorted by total rewards accrued) into 20, 10, 5, 4, and 2 groups, with equal numbers in each group (4, 8, 16, 20, and 40 respectively). Although the precise values of the ratios depend on the number of groups, the relative ranking remains almost completely consistent. All ratios in Table C.1 exceed 1, implying that the data are most likely under MMPC with uncertainty in *D* in all cases. The next best fits are provided by RSPC with uncertainty in *D* and OPC for *RA*, their order depending on the split. Somewhat further behind comes the OPC for *RR*_m, trailed by MMPC with uncertainty in the SNR, and finally the parameter-free OPC for *RR*.

Appendix D. Comparison of pure and extended DD models for experiment 1

As explained in Bogacz et al. (in press) only the first of the two experiments described in this paper yielded sufficient data for fits to the extended DD model to be feasible. Comparison of extended DD parameters obtained by such data fits, averaged over the 20 subjects, to fits of the same data to the pure DD process reveals the following. (We identify the source of the parameters by the parenthetical notes ext. and pure respectively.)

Mean values of the threshold-to-drift ratios θ (ext.) are approximately half θ (pure), mean values of the SNR η (ext.) are approximately triple η (pure), while mean values of the nondecision time T_0 (ext.) are very close to T_0 (pure). In all cases the extended and pure parameter values are strongly correlated across subjects (θ : $r = 0.61, p = 0.004, \eta$: $r = 0.92, p < 10^{-5}$ and $T_0: r = 0.67, p = 0.001$ (Bogacz et al., in press, Fig. 4)), and the resulting optimal threshold-to-drift ratios are also strongly correlated ($r = 0.71, p < 10^{-5}$). This leads to the fact that overall correlations between subjects' thresholds and the optimal thresholds obtained from the pure and extended DD fits do not substantially differ $(r_1 = 0.44(p < 10^{-5}))$ for pure, and $r_1 = 0.62(p < 10^{-5})$ for extended.) Moreover, comparisons of the mean thresholds (averaged over these 20 subjects) with the optimal thresholds computed analytically for the pure, and numerically for the extended DD processes, for all four delay conditions, reveal very similar patterns. See Bogacz et al. (in press, Fig. 5).

We believe that this is because the substantial variances in the SNR and threshold-to-drift ratio for the extended DD model are compensated by higher noise variance σ^2 in the pure DD fits (i.e., all the sources of variance are lumped in a lower SNR η (pure)). To further gauge the effects of drift and initial condition variance we compared mean decision times and error rates for the extended DD fits with the corresponding quantities evaluated for a pure DD process with η and θ equal to the mean values of the extended DD parameters. We found that $\langle DT \rangle$ s for the two processes were very similar (r = 0.94, $p < 10^{-5}$), but that p(err) s were significantly lower for the pure DD process (paired *t*-test $p < 10^{-5}$), presumably due to the unrealistically high SNRs that result when the other sources of variance are removed from the extended DD model.

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